We consider the …scal multiplier and spillover in an environment in which two countries are caught simultaneously in a liquidity trap. Using a standard New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) model, an optimizing two-country sticky price model, we show that the …scal multiplier and spillover are contrary to those predicted in textbook economics. For the country with government expenditure, the …scal multiplier exceeds one, the currency depreciates, and the terms of trade worsen. The …scal spillover is negative if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one and positive if the parameter is greater than one. Incomplete stabilization of marginal costs due to the existence of the zero lower bound is a crucial factor in understanding the e¤ects of …scal policy in open economies.
Introduction
The liquidity trap has become an issue of global concern. The economic downturn following the …nancial turmoil that …rst began to emerge in 2007 has resulted in monetary policy with virtually a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates simultaneously in a number of countries, including Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States. As a result, many countries are attempting to stimulate aggregate demand and production via …scal expansion.
In this paper, we theoretically investigate the e¤ects of …scal policy in which two countries are caught simultaneously in a liquidity trap, and compare the results with that under normal circumstances. Using the standard New Open Economy Macroeconomics (NOEM) model, which is a two-country sticky price model, we analyze the …scal multiplier-the extent to which one country's government expenditure increases production in that countryand the …scal spillover-the extent to which one country's government expenditure boosts production in the other country. We examine whether …scal expansion yields a beggar-thyneighbor situation.
Fiscal expansion is considered to yield di¤ering outcomes, depending on interest rate environments. According to textbook economics, …scal expansion under ‡exible exchange rates is thought to be not e¤ective (Dornbusch, Fisher, and Startz, 2008 ). In the MundellFleming model (Mundell, 1967) , where the economy is characterized by ‡exible exchange rates, …xed domestic prices, and perfect capital mobility, …scal expansion builds up upward pressure on interest rates in the home country. Subsequently, the exchange rate appreciates.
That o¤sets the increase in demand for home-produced goods by crowding out exports. 1 Recently, the abovementioned NOEM model launched by Svensson and Van Wijnbergen (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) has become the workhorse model for the monetary policy analysis in an open economy. In the NOEM model with producer currency pricing, 1 Whether this crowing out e¤ect completely o¤sets the e¤ects on the demand depends on the assumptions about the model. For example, another standard text book by Krugman and Obstfeld (2006) shows that not permanent but temporal …scal expansion can have a positive short-run e¤ect on output. Even with permanent …scal expansion, if the economy is not initially at the long-run equilibrium, the …scal multiplier can be positive. optimal monetary policy is aiming at price stability. When the central banks follow optimal monetary policy, as will be explained in detail later, domestic interest rates are raised after an increase in the domestically produced goods price stemming from a positive government shock. The nominal exchange rate appreciates and the terms of trade improve for the domestic country. This induces the production switching from domestic to foreign country.
Consequently, the …scal multiplier becomes less than one.
However, such conventional wisdom obtained from the Mundell-Fleming model or the NOEM model with optimal monetary policy for the ine¤ectiveness of …scal policy may be overturned in a liquidity trap. This is because in the liquidity trap, nominal interest rates are kept low despite …scal expansion. Low interest rates prevent the exchange rate from appreciating. The economic activity in the home country is thus stimulated rather than dampened. This mechanism in a liquidity trap is somewhat similar to the case when monetary policy does not completely stabilize but rather accommodates the distortions from a government spending shock, as examined by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) . There, monetary policy, namely money supply, is assumed to be constant. 2 Relatively lowered domestic consumption due to a positive government shock yields a downward pressure on the home money demand. 3 To keep money supply constant, a nominal interest rate falls, resulting in a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate and worsening in the terms of trade for the domestic country. Consequently, the multiplier becomes larger than unity. In both cases, the key factor is incomplete stabilization of marginal costs. 4 Using a standard two-country sticky price, namely the NOEM model, we demonstrate 2 In early NOEM models represented by Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) or Corsetti and Pesenti (2001) , money supply is the tool of monetary policy for nominal spending control. It is not trivial to express the problem regarding the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates with such NOEM models. Therefore, we employ the recently widely used NOEM model represented by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2002) or Benigno and Benigno (2003) , where short-term nominal interest rates are the monetary policy tool and nominal rigidity is introduced through the Calvo friction rather than one-period-ahead price setting. 3 Relative domestic consumption decreases, because of the assumption of an incomplete market. In
Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995), households in two countries have access to not state-contingent assets but an integrated world real bond. 4 Note that this is true irrespective of whether we consider the closed or open economy.
that the size of multipliers and the sign (positive or negative) associated with the spillover in a global liquidity trap are contrary to those predicted in the Mundell-Fleming model or in the NOEM model with optimal monetary policy. In a global liquidity trap, the …scal multiplier exceeds one. The …scal spillover is negative if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one and positive if the parameter is greater than one.
Incomplete stabilization of marginal costs due to the existence of the zero lower bound is a crucial factor in understanding the e¤ects of …scal policy in open economies. Thanks to this, government spending in the home country raises the marginal costs of home-produced goods, which increases expected in ‡ation rates and decreases real interest rates. Intertemporal optimization causes consumption to increase, so that the …scal multiplier exceeds one.
This e¤ect functions to increase demand for foreign-produced goods, as well, but the …scal spillover may be negative due to the following mechanism. While government spending continues, the price of home-produced goods increases more than that of foreign-produced goods. Expecting that two countries are at symmetric equilibrium when government spending ends, the home currency depreciates and the home terms of trade worsen on impact when government spending begins. That shifts demand for goods from foreign-produced goods to home-produced ones. The …scal spillover thus may become negative depending on the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. frameworks with nonlinearity, di¤erent monetary policy, and/or various shocks and policy measures. 6 Our model does not deal with some of their developments, but instead discuss the …scal multiplier and spillover in a global liquidity trap, which have not been studied in the previous literature.
The closest research to ours is Cook and Devereux (2011). 7 Cook and Devereux (2011) also analyze the e¤ects of …scal policy in a global liquidity trap using a sticky price model, reporting almost the same …ndings. Yet, there exist several di¤erences. First, two papers introduce a di¤erent assumption regarding the duration of government expenditure. In Cook and Devereux (2011) , the duration of government expenditure is the same as that of the adverse shock that brings about the liquidity trap. In our model, the duration of government expenditure is up to two periods, which is shorter than the duration of the adverse shock. By using this assumption, we simplify our analysis and clarify the underlying mechanism that produces the multiplier greater than one and the spillover which can be either positive or negative. Second, as our original contributions, we highlight the importance of the size of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in in ‡uencing the sign of spillover. We also study the e¤ects of incomplete markets and local currency pricing, instead of complete markets and producer currency pricing, which are common both in Cook and Devereux (2011) and ours. Especially, this paper is the …rst study to show that …scal spillover in a global liquidity trap becomes positive with local currency pricing even when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than one. In addition, we consider a less strict in ‡ation targeting rule. Third, as the unique contribution of Cook and Devereux 7 We found this paper after we released our discussion paper in March 2010. method of maintaining low interest rates seems controversial. For example, Corsetti, Meier, and Muller (2010) establish a low interest rate environment by proposing a …scal expansion policy that is followed by a reduction in spending over time. Our setup of considering a low interest rate environment by means of the zero lower bound is natural, and the bound is now realized. Moreover, while their analysis is numerical, we can show analytically the degree of the …scal multiplier and the sign of the spillover. It helps us understand the underlying mechanism and determine the sensitivity of our results to the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption. 8 The structure of the paper is as follows. The economy consists of a home country H and a foreign country F . Labor is not mobile and it is used to produce a continuum of di¤erentiated goods on the unit intervals [0; 1] in both countries.
Household A representative household in the home country maximizes subject to the budget constraint:
The consumption bundle per capita C t is de…ned by
As a result, the utility based aggregate price index (CPI) P t , is described as
The consumption index represents bundles of di¤erentiated home-produced goods C H;t and foreign-produced goods C F;t , both spent in the home country per capita. The aggregate price index composes of a domestic good price P H;t and a foreign good price P F;t . We denote the weight for the bundle of home-produced goods by n (0 < n < 1) and for foreign-produced goods by 1 n. We can use n to interpret as the relative size of the home country. The intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods is one. We denote hours worked by h t ; nominal wage by W t ; lump-sum pro…ts by t ; taxes by T; bond holdings by B t and the gross nominal interest rate by i t . The object E t D t+1
is an Arrow security, standing for the quantity of home currency to be delivered in period t + 1 if state s t+1 is realized at t + 1, conditional on history up to t. The associated price is Q t;t+1 . Household preferences are governed by factors common to the two countries: discount factor 0 < t < 1, the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption , the utility weight on hours worked ; and the Frisch elasticity of labor supply !. (2003), Christiano (2004) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), we assume that the discount factor is stochastic and is the origin of the liquidity trap. We call this natural rate shock. In the zero-in ‡ation steady state, the natural rate is positive, so the zero bound does not bind. However, if a large-scale shock decreases the natural rate to negative, the zero bound starts to bind. The real interest rate remains too high, contracting the real economic activity and rendering the economy sub-optimal.
Following Eggertsson and Woodford
The preferences are set as
where G t represents government expenditure in the home country. Similarly, we de…ne
for home-produced goods C H;t that are spent in the foreign country, where superscript * denotes foreign variables.
Firms Regarding …rms, Y t and Y t represent aggregate home and foreign productions
respectively. An intermediate good is produced by a continuous number of monopolists using the production technology:
Each monopolist maximizes its pro…ts subject to its demand curve and the Calvo-type price friction where is the probability that the monopolist cannot re-optimize its price.
Under the setting, each monopolist maximizes the discounted sum of the pro…ts:
where P H;t is the reset price.
We assume producer currency pricing and therefore the law of one price. Let the aggregate price (in ‡ation rate) of domestic goods and foreign goods be P H ( H ) and P F ( F ); respectively. Also, let a nominal exchange rate as the number of home currency units per unit of foreign currency be S t . Then, the price of domestic goods sold in the foreign country is described simply as
Fiscal and Monetary Policy Regarding …scal policy, as is illustrated in equation (3), we assume that the government buys only domestic goods for G t . This assumption yields the deviation of the terms of trade from its steady-state level. Fully coordinated …scal spending in the two countries would make our results isomorphic to those in a closed economy framework. 9 As for monetary policy, following Christiano (2004), we assume that domestic and foreign central banks conduct an optimal discretionary policy to stabilize in ‡ation.
Market Clearing Finally, the resource constraint is given by
Output of the homogeneous home good is related to aggregate employment by
where the relative price dispersion term H;t is given by
Using this, the resource constraint is rearranged as
Under the Calvo price frictions, the dynamics of H;t are de…ned by
where the gross in ‡ation rate of P H;t is de…ned as
9 For simplicity, we neglect government expenditure in the foreign country. Given symmetry, it is straightforward to analyze this, except for the size of home country n: The e¤ect of government expenditure in both countries can be analyzed easily, too, by summing the e¤ect of government expenditure in the home country and that in the foreign country, as long as the …rst-order approximation is accurate.
Linearized System of Equations
Using the above setup, we can derive the log-linearlized system of equations with respect to the four variables ofŶ ,Ŷ ,^ H ; and^ F ; as follows:
and^
The circum ‡ex (^) indicates the log-linearized deviation of the variable from its steady state, with the exception ofĜ t = (G t G)=Y: A parameter g_y represents the steady state ratio of government expenditure to output. The …rst two equations represent IS curves with respect to domestic goods and foreign goods. DeductingĜ t fromŶ t , the IS curves indicate the Euler equations with respect to consumption. The last two equations represent the New Keynesian Phillips curves with respect to in ‡ation in the home country and in the foreign country. Government spending in ‡uences the marginal costs of domestic and foreign goods via the resource constraints and the labor market equilibrium conditions.
Fiscal Multiplier and Spillover under Normal Circumstances
Before calculating the …scal multiplier and spillover step by step, we summarize …ndings in this paper in Table 1 . Numbers show the actual multiplier or spillover. Signs inside brackets represent a comparison of the …scal multiplier and spillover with those of a closed economy: +, 0, and -imply that the multiplier or spillover is larger than, equal to, and smaller than in the closed economy, respectively. As we will see, incomplete stabilization 
of marginal costs due to the existence of the zero lower bound is a crucial factor for these results.
The …rst row represents the multiplier or spillover under normal circumstances, provided contemporaneous government spending. The table demonstrates that the multiplier is below one, irrespective of the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption : Spillover can be positive or negative, depending on :
The second row represents the multiplier or spillover in a global liquidity trap where two countries are constrained by the zero lower bound, provided contemporaneous government spending. The table demonstrates that the multiplier is one, which is greater than that under normal circumstances. Spillover is zero. Government spending has no e¤ect on foreign production.
The third row represents the …scal multiplier and spillover in a global liquidity trap at time t, when government spending is anticipated for the next period t+1. The table demonstrates that the multiplier is positive. In other words, when the next period government spending is anticipated, home production increases on impact before its materialization. If contemporaneous government spending is also present, the multiplier becomes the sum of the second and third rows, hence exceeding one. Spillover is positive or negative, depending on . The sign ‡ips over from that under normal circumstances.
Fiscal multiplier
To discuss Table 1 in detail, we …rst consider a case in which neither central bank in two countries is constrained by the zero lower bound of nominal interest rates, using the above NOEM model summarized by equations (5) to (8) . With producer currency pricing, there are only two kinds of aggregate in ‡ation. Therefore, irrespective of the in ‡ation index to be targeted, two policies in two countries are enough to stabilize in ‡ation in two countries. 10 Further, as shown by the NOEM models of Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002) and Benigno and Benigno (2003) , since price stability of producer prices is the optimal discretion and the commitment monetary policy, central banks achieve zero in ‡ation in both countries. 11 Under this optimal monetary policy, marginal costs expressed in the …rst term of the right-hand side of the Phillips curves in equations (7) and (8) become zero. Thus, analysis in this section can be considered as one to use the simple international real business cycle model without capital, namely under the ‡exible price equilibrium.
As a result, the …scal multiplier associated with government spending in the home country is given by
Since the second term is positive under standard calibration of parameters, the …scal multiplier is lower than one. Compared to the …scal multiplier in a closed economy model in
we can see
The two multipliers naturally become equal when n = 1; that is, when the relative size of the home country is in…nite. The inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption in ‡uences the relative size of the …scal multiplier to that in a closed economy. When > 1; the …scal multiplier is smaller than it is in a closed economy. When 0 < < 1; the …scal multiplier becomes larger than that in a closed economy. When = 1;
as shown by Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002), the two countries become insular. Hence, the …scal multiplier equals that in a closed economy, irrespective of the size of n.
Fiscal spillover
The …scal spillover of the home country's government spending in the foreign country is given by
The …scal spillover is positive if > 1 and negative if 0 < < 1. If = 1; the two countries become insular and there is no spillover. Naturally, there is no spillover in a closed economy model.
Mechanism
The intuition behind these results and the di¤erences from the case under the closed economy can be understood as follows. The key is the e¤ects from the terms of trade T oT t .
The terms of trade are denoted by
which is log-linearized as
Government spending directly increases production and employment in the home country.
That yields an upward pressure on home prices, and to prevent this, monetary policy is is derived by combining the resource constraint and the labor market equilibrium condition:
This equation implies that, …rst, by a¤ecting output prices, the improvement in the terms of trade directly decreases real marginal costs in the home country. 12 On the other hand, it increases real marginal costs in the foreign country. To completely stabilize in ‡ation rates so that real marginal costs become constant, home employment needs to increase while foreign employment needs to decrease. Second, the improvement in the terms of trade induces production switching from domestic to foreign goods. Given domestic output, that requires a rise in output in the foreign country. Total consumption rises in both countries, and due to risk sharing, both domestic and foreign consumption rise by the same amount.
The rise in domestic consumption raises real marginal costs in the home country, and to o¤set the rise in prices, home employment needs to decrease. 13 Its size grows with .
Consequently, if > 1; the …rst channel is dominated by the second channel. Home employment decreases, which makes the …scal multiplier smaller than that in a closed economy. Foreign employment increases, which yields positive …scal spillover. If 0 < < 1;
the …rst channel dominates the second channel. Home employment increases, which makes the …scal multiplier larger than that in a closed economy. Foreign employment decreases, which yields negative …scal spillover. If = 1; the two channels o¤set each other. The …scal multiplier equals that in a closed economy and the …scal spillover becomes zero, since the two countries are insular. 14 It is worth noting that the implications for welfare are di¤erent. Higher production means higher employment. That has the e¤ect of decreasing welfare, while because of 1 2 This is the terms of trade e¤ ects according to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). 1 3 This is the risk sharing e¤ ects according to Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2002). 1 4 The sensitivity to depends on the form of utility. For example, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Hu¤man (1988) use the following utility function:
That function, not additively separable, abstracts the income e¤ect on labor. Real marginal costs are independent of . perfect risk sharing, consumption in the two countries is the same. 15 Recall that, if > 1; the …scal multiplier is lower and the …scal spillover is higher compared with the case of a closed economy. Therefore, if > 1; government spending produces superior social outcomes for the country than would be seen in the case of a closed economy, because households in the foreign country work more to produce more goods. That leads to the beggar-thy-neighbor problem. Also note that, as Tille (2001) and Benigno and Benigno (2003) point out, welfare implications are highly dependent on other parameters, such as the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods, which in this paper is assumed to be 1. Consequently, whether is larger or smaller than unity is crucial in the analyses of this paper.
Fiscal Multiplier and Spillover in a Global Liquidity Trap
We next consider a case in which the zero lower bound constrains central banks. Central bank cannot achieve complete price stability any more. We follow Christiano (2004) and Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009). The natural rate shock^ t occurs at periods t = 1; ; T 1, and returns to zero at period T . Central banks pursue optimal discretionary policy to stabilize in ‡ation. For simplicity, we further assume that government spending in the home country G t is implemented only for two periods, at t = 1 and t = 2 < T . 16 The government spending is not large enough to push the economy out of the liquidity trap.
Using lag-operator L, we arrange equations (5) to (8) . Since we assume that government spending in the home country G t is implemented for only two periods, at t = 1 and t = 2;
…rst-order approximation up to L 1 is su¢ cient. The …scal multiplier is approximated up 1 5 Note that we do not assume any utility gain from government expenditure. For an analysis on the optimal level of government expenditure with a small utility gain from it, see Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009). 1 6 Extending the periods of government spending does not change our main results. Also for simplicity, we focus on the …scal multiplier and spillover only on the initial date. We can compute those on the future dates following Christiano (2004) , but the analysis becomes less intuitive.
to the …rst order aŝ
where C(L 1 ) and C (L 1 ) are the …rst-order functions of L 1 , which are of little importance for the …scal multiplier and spillover in a global liquidity trap.
Fiscal multiplier
The coe¢ cients onĜ t andĜ t+1 represent the …scal multiplier. Equation (11) suggests that completely temporary government spendingĜ t has a multiplier of one. It already exceeds the multiplier in the previous section. Government spending in the next periodĜ t+1 has a multiplier of
in period t. Multi-period government spending increases the …scal multiplier. As falls, the …scal multiplier becomes larger. Government spending in the past period, t-1, has no e¤ect on output at time t, because the model is purely forward-looking.
According to Christiano (2004) , the …scal multiplier in a closed economy is 1 forĜ t : A one-time government expenditure has a multiplier of the same amplitude even in a global liqudity trap. The …scal multiplier in a closed economy forĜ t+1 is given by
If > 1; the …scal multiplier in an open economy is larger than it is in a closed economy.
If 0 < < 1; the …scal multiplier is smaller than that in a closed economy. If = 1; the …scal multiplier equals that in a closed economy, since the two countries become insular.
Interestingly, the results here are quite contrary to those obtained in the previous section.
Fiscal spillover
The …scal spillover is given bŷ
where D(L 1 ) and D (L 1 ) are the …rst-order functions of L 1 . The coe¢ cients onĜ t andĜ t+1 are zero and
respectively. Completely temporary government spendingĜ t has no spillover while government spending for the next periodĜ t+1 has negative (positive) spillover if > (<)1. If = 1; there is no spillover. As n rises, the absolute size of the spillover tends to increase.
Note that the signs of the spillover computed here are the opposite of those obtained under normal circumstances.
Mechanism
For the …scal multiplier, we discuss the di¤erences from the cases without a liquidity trap in the open economy as well as with a liquidity trap in a closed economy. For the …scal spillover, since there is no spillover e¤ect in a closed economy, we only compare the results without a liquidity trap to these with a liquidity trap, using the same NOEM model.
Incomplete stabilization of marginal costs due to the existence of the zero lower bound is a crucial factor in determining the size of the …scal multiplier and spillover.
Fiscal Multiplier
The mechanism for the higher …scal multiplier in a global liquidity trap compared to the case without zero lower bound is basically the same as those obtained in Christiano (2004), Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2009), and Woodford (2011). 17 Government spending directly increases production and employment in the home country. That yields an upward pressure on home prices. Because of the zero lower bound, in ‡ation rates and marginal costs are not stabilized. 18 They increase, and real interest rates drop. Intertemporal 1 7 As written in Introduction, this mechanism is somewhat similar to the situation supposed in Obstfeld and Rogo¤ (1995) that monetary policy does not completely stabilize the ine¢ cient ‡uctuations stemming from a government spending shock. optimization causes consumption to increase. That yields a greater …scal multiplier than that in the previous section. Thus, the increase in consumption is larger as is lower.
There exist open economy e¤ects via the changes in the terms of trade through , that yield di¤erences from the case in a closed economy, as is explained in the previous section.
The sign of the …scal multiplier does, however, not change by as shown in Table 1 .
These altogether imply that the main factor for the higher multiplier in a global liquidity trap compared to the case without zero lower bound is the inability of complete stabilization of ine¢ cient ‡uctuations of marginal costs. Table 1 shows the quite contrary results for the …scal spillover depending on whether economies are caught in a global liquidity trap or not. Again, the di¤erence is stemming from the incomplete stabilization of marginal costs in a global liquidity trap, but we here explain the detailed mechanism behind this result.
Fiscal Spillover
Government spending has two opposing e¤ects. First, it shifts demand for goods from foreign-produced goods to home-produced goods. When government spending ends, the terms of trade are at equilibrium: the price of home-produced goods is as expensive as that of foreign-produced goods. While government spending continues, the price of homeproduced goods increases more than that of foreign-produced goods. In other words, re‡ecting the higher in ‡ation of home-produced goods in the future, nominal exchange rates jump toward deprecation immediately after the government spending shock. Therefore, when government spending begins, the terms of trade worsen: home-produced goods are relatively cheaper than foreign-produced goods. It increases demand for home-produced goods, and decreases demand for foreign-produced goods. Second, the increase in expected in ‡ation rates lowers real interest rates and increases demand for foreign-produced goods.
The second e¤ect becomes weaker, as the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption, , becomes greater. If is greater (less) than one, the …rst e¤ect dominates (is dominated by) the second channel. Fiscal spillover becomes negative (positive).
More precise mechanism runs as follows. For completely temporary government spend-ing, domestic production rises by the same amount while home consumption does not change. Real marginal costs rise, which increases prices of home-produced goods on impact. In the foreign economy, production and consumption do not change, so prices of foreign-produced goods measured in the foreign currency do not change. The terms of trade do not change because the currency of the home country depreciates on impact.
The fact that the nominal exchange rates change may seem contradictory with the uncovered interest parity condition, given that nominal interest rates in both countries are bound at zero. Yet, it is not contradictory at all: the expected change in nominal exchange rates remains unchanged. Also note that because government spending is completely temporary, expected in ‡ation rates in two countries do not change. That makes real interest rates and consumption unchanged in both countries.
Then, consider a case in which there is government spending at t = 2 as well as at t = 1. Backward induction addresses the underlying mechanism. The economy at t = 2 is close to the economy when there is completely temporary government spending at t = 1.
The terms of trade are at equilibrium at t = 2. Prices of home-produced goods rise bŷ H;2 while prices of foreign-produced goods do not change. The only di¤erence is in the nominal exchange rates. From t = 1 to t = 2; nominal exchange rates do not move due to the uncovered interest parity condition. Expected appreciation (depreciation) is zero re ‡ecting the zero nominal interest rates in both countries. It suggests that the terms of trade at t = 1 are positive by^ H;2 , meaning that the terms of trade worsen or nominal exchange rates depreciate at t = 1 for the home country. 19 From equation (10), we havê
Worsening of the terms of trade increases home-produced goods but decreases foreignproduced goods. On the other hand, because of a rise in the home-produced good at t = 2, the aggregate in ‡ation rate in the home country rises by n^ H;2 , which lowers the real interest rate by n^ H;2 at t = 1. Due to intertemporal optimization, that increases aggregate consumption in the two countries as
A decrease in the real interest rate increases both home-produced goods and foreignproduced goods. Clearly, equations (12) and (13) altogether suggest that, for 0 < < 1;
Y 1 increases, while for > 1;Ŷ 1 decreases. 20 As is larger, the e¤ect of the real interest rate onŶ 1 becomes smaller. The increase inŶ 1 is dominated by the decrease inŶ 1 stemming from the worsening (improvement) of the terms of trade for the home (foreign)
country. The …scal spillover thus becomes negative for a large .
Regarding welfare, a lower …scal multiplier or higher spillover is better for the country where the government spending takes place. Therefore, if > 1; government spending is socially worse for the country with government spending than in a closed economy, since households in the foreign country work less to produce less goods. It does not yield the beggar-thy-neighbor problem, but ends up with beggar-thy-self.
Extension
In this section, we extend the model by incorporating incomplete …nancial markets, a less strict interest rate rule against in ‡ation, or local currency pricing.
Incomplete Financial Markets
In the main part of this paper, we assumed complete …nancial markets. The household has an access to the Arrow security, leading to perfect international risk sharing:
Since our model does not assume a home bias in demand for goods and the representative households of the two countries are equally wealthy in the initial period, the real exchange rate e t remains unity. Home and foreign consumption is perfectly aligned:
When markets are incomplete, such perfect international risk sharing is not always attainable. As a particular and rather extreme type of incompleteness, let us consider 2 0 Regarding exchange rates, the validity of the uncovered interest parity condition has often been called into question. Our results are, however, robust to the uncovered interest parity condition because there are no interest rate di¤erences between two countries. …nancial autarky. Net nominal export must be zero, and the above risk sharing equation is replaced by (1 n)P H;t C H;t nP F;t C F;t = 0:
Using demand equations and log-linearizing the above equation, we obtain p H;t + ( p H;t +Ĉ t ) =p F;t + ( p F;t +Ĉ t ):
Therefore, the same international risk sharing equation holds:
Such a result appears surprising, but actually is consistent with the …nding discovered Consequently, our previous results are unchanged under incomplete …nancial markets.
When the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods deviates from one, our previous results will change. But its degree is minor under plausible parameter values, according to Cole and Obstfeld (1991) and Woodford (2010).
Interest Rate Rule
To examine the e¤ects of monetary policy on the …scal multiplier and spillover, we simulate the model using four variants of the following interest rate rule:
The …rst is our benchmark, which is equivalent to = 0 and ! 1. Second, we consider the rule of = 0 and = 1:5. Third and fourth, we consider the rules with smoothing, captured by = 0:5 and = 1:5 and = 0:9 and = 1:5; respectively. Since our interest is in the …scal multiplier and spillover in the global liquidity trap, we focus only on the case in which the two countries are faced with the zero lower bound. In the simulation, a sequence of large negative shocks to the natural rate of interest (^ = 0:05) is given for ten quarters. We assume …scal spending with the size of 1 % of GDP only in the domestic country. The duration of such …scal spending is set to be two quarters. Parameters are calibrated to the conventional values as in Table 2 . (11) suggests, completely temporary government spendingĜ t has a multiplier of one in period 2. In period 1, government spending yields the multiplier larger than 1. Since we assume > 1 in this simulation, the …scal spillover is negative.
The terms of trade and the nominal exchange rate both increase, suggesting a worsening of the terms of trade and a currency depreciation.
We cannot …nd any di¤erence in both multiplier and spillover among examined policy rules. As is obvious from the two …gures in the second row, in order to compute the multiplier and spillover in the global liquidity trap, we deliberately create a situation where nominal interest rates are constrained at zero irrespective of …scal spending. It is true that a di¤erence among interest rate rules can alter the optimal paths of variables after the termination of the zero bound period, which also induces a jump in the nominal exchange rate in period one. This can lead to some di¤erence in the multiplier and spillover, if negative shocks to the natural rate of interest rate are small and the duration of such shocks is short.
Local Currency Pricing
Under local currency pricing, the law of one price no longer holds. Instead, home …rms optimize the price of goods sold in the foreign country, P H;t ; by maximizing the following pro…ts:
We here assume the same price stickiness for P H;t as that for P H;t . Similarly, P F;t can be calculated for foreign goods sold in the home country.
Under those setup, nine equations are obtained for nine variablesŶ ,Ŷ ,ê, p H , p F ,^ ,
n ê t+1 ;
H;t = (1 ) (1 )
+ ^ H;t+1 ;
: Under local currency pricing, we observe positive …scal spillover irrespective of whether is larger (smaller) than unity and the economy is in period 2 as well as period 1. The mechanism of positive spillover under local currency pricing is understood via the global resource constraint in equation (14) . The global resource constraint in equation (14) is obtained …rst by log-linearizing equations (1), (2) and (4) for each country and then com- 2 1 Under producer currency pricing, the real exchange rate remains unity, so was not depicted in Figure   1 .
bining them. Since the terms of trade are de…ned by T oT t = P F;t S t P H;t under local currency pricing, equation (14) is transformed intô
when n = 0:5. Basically, this equation tells when the terms of trade improve for the domestic country or when the domestic real exchange rate appreciates, the level of domestic production decreases relatively more to the level of the foreign production. Figure 2 illustrates that irrespective of , the terms of trade decrease, indicating the improvement for the domestic country. This is because a domestic currency depreciation improves the terms of trade for the country under local currency pricing. In equation (15), the e¤ect of the worsening of the terms of trade dominates that of the depreciation of the real exchange rate. This is due to the currency misalignments that are formally de…ned by Engel (2011) .
Under local currency pricing, changes in the nominal exchange rate do not feed into the export price. As a result, the …scal spillover becomes positive under local currency pricing, when the zero bound of nominal interest rates is binding.
On the other hand, under producer currency pricing, the terms of trade are de…ned by equation (9) , and the global resource constraint is given by equation (10) . As shown in Figure 1 , a relative increase in the in ‡ation rate in the domestic country induces an initial jump in the nominal exchange rate toward depreciation. These developments worsen the terms of trade. This makes home-produced goods relatively cheaper than foreign-produced goods and increases demand for home-produced goods, and decreases demand for foreignproduced goods. Consequently, …scal expenditure in the domestic country has negative spillover e¤ects on the foreign output when > 1.
Conclusion
In this paper, we …nd that the …scal multiplier exceeds one in a global liquidity trap. On the other hand, the …scal spillover is negative if the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consumption is less than one and positive if the parameter is greater than one. The size of the multiplier and the sign (positive or negative) associated with the spillover are quite contrary to those in the undergraduate textbook, those without the zero lower bound, and those under the ‡exible price equilibrium or the sticky price equilibrium with optimal monetary policy. Incomplete stabilization of marginal costs due to the existence of the zero lower bound is crucial in understanding the e¤ects of …scal policy in open economies. In addition, we also show that the …scal spillover in a global liquidity trap becomes positive under local currency pricing, even when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is less than unity. This result stems from the fact that a currency deprecation re ‡ecting …scal expansion in the domestic country improves the terms of trade under local currency pricing while it deteriorates the terms of trade under producer currency pricing.
We have so far considered only symmetric cases. A further question could be, in a situation where only the foreign country is constrained by the zero lower bound, how does government expenditure in the home country in ‡uence the foreign country's economy.
Another issue is how the government spending is used. A part of the government spending may contribute directly to a household's utility. Government spending may be used to purchase not only home goods but also foreign goods. Local currency pricing instead of producer currency pricing may alter our results. The validity of uncovered interest parity becomes crucial when we consider asymmetric cases between two countries. These issues will be addressed in future research.
